This article only considers the theory of natural law as the theory of law. This is not to say that legal theory can be fully recognized and pursued independent of moral and political theory. There is no denying that the valuable natural law theory is more concerned with the basic issues in ethics and political theory than with law or legal theory. An example of this broader, more fundamental theory is cenaquinas’ moral, political, and legal philosophy. In this article, the theory of natural law should be regarded as the abbreviation of the theory of natural law, as long as they are related to law, they are the theory of law. This focus has an important side effect. Many important historical differences between natural law theorists can be omitted. Compared with the nature and function (or concept) of normalization, more differences are related to the basis of normalization.
As positivists or legal positivists, legal theorists who put forward or understand their theories think that their theories are opposite to or at least different from natural law theories. On the other hand, natural law theorists did not oppose their theories to legal positivism, or even different from legal positivism (Contra Soper 1992 at 2395). The word “real law” was first widely spread by Aquinas in philosophy. His theory of natural law has something in common with many or almost all positivist theories, or at least spare no effort to deny that the theory of natural law is wrong. According to the theory of natural law, law can be regarded as a pure social fact of power and practice, and a series of reasons for action. These reasons can and often are reasonable reasons, so they are normative for reasonable people. This duality of the law is based on the famous slogan that “unjust law is not law”. To understand correctly, this slogan shows that, based on the denial of skepticism, there is any reasonable reason to take action (the denial can be shelved because it is self refutation to defend it). It is meaningless for positivists to oppose the theory of natural law, which is superfluous: what the positivists regard as the reality to be confirmed has been confirmed by the theory of natural law, and they regard it as a characteristic The hallucinations to be eliminated are not part of the theory of natural law. However, because their authors believe that positivist legal theories, in general, are dominant in the environment of those who may read this article, it seems appropriate to refer to these theories along the way, hoping to overcome some misunderstandings (while promoting some clarifications and improvements in the theorization of natural law) and generate some unnecessary debates
The views mentioned in the preceding paragraph were put forward by orrego (orrego 2007) in another way. When the narratives of trial and judicial reasoning put forward by the contemporary mainstream legal theories are added to the narratives (Concepts) of law, it is obvious that at the propositional level (different from the names, words and expressions), these theories are the same as the main arguments (though not always contradictory) put forward by the classical natural law theorists such as Aquinas on Law: (I) law Law establishes the reason for action, (II) its rules can and presumed (infeasible) produce moral obligations, which do not exist before the positioning of the rules, (III) that kind of legal moral obligation is defeated by a serious immorality (injustice) of the assumed rules, and (IV) judicial and other paradigms of Legal Deliberation, reasoning and judgment. At the same time, it includes natural (moral) law and (pure) positive law. Orregos’s view seems to have been confirmed by the neighboring entries of legal positivism (green 2003). The contemporary positivist theory seems to be the theory of natural law, which is different from the main body of natural law theory (a) the denial of legal theory (different from trial theory, judicial responsibility theory, citizen loyalty theory, etc.) necessarily or most appropriately deals with the relevant issues just listed, therefore, (b) due to the incompleteness of their legal theory, that is, their absence (usually, but not always Yes, from their narratives of relevant matters) systematic attention to the basis of systems or moral norms and other normative claims.